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Abstract
We model sex selection and the equilibrium sex ratio, when parents care about their
childs marriage prospects. With intrinsic son preference, selection results in a male-
biased sex ratio. This is ine¢ cient, due to a marriage market congestion externality.
Medical innovations that facilitate selection aggravate the ine¢ ciency. If son preference
arises endogenously, due to population growth causing an excess supply of women on
the marriage market, selection may improve welfare. Empirically, sex selection causes
an excess of males and reduces welfare in China. In India, rising cohort sizes give rise
to an excess of women in most parts of the country.
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In many parts of the world, parents exhibit gender bias, and prefer to have sons. This
phenomenon is especially prevalent in South and East Asia. In Northern India, it is common
to celebrate the birth of a boy and bemoan that of a girl. The community of hijras (eunuchs),
who make their living by extorting money on joyous occasions such as the birth of a child,
demand substantially larger amounts when the child is male. Gender bias is reected in
male biased sex ratios, and the problem of "missing women" (Sen, 1990), a problem that
was already noted in the rst Indian census of 1871. Historically, sex ratio imbalances have
been attributed to the relative neglect of girls, but in extreme cases, infanticide has also been
practised. In Dharmapuri district of Tamil Nadu, India, infant girls were often fed uncooked
rice, as a way of inducing rapid death. In Punjab (northern India), the caste of Bedi Sikhs
have traditionally been known as kudi-maar "girl-killer".1
Modern medicine has aggravated the problem by facilitating selection for boys. The
development and spread of amniocentesis and ultrasound screening in the early 1980s made
foetal sex determination possible, permitting sex selective abortion. Sex selective abortion
is illegal in China and India, but the practice ourishes. It is hard to see how such a law
can be enforced given that neither ultrasound nor abortions are illegal, so that sex selective
abortion is unveriable. These technological developments have been associated with a rapid
increase in the sex ratio at birth in East/South Asia, from its usual norm of 105-106 boys
per 100 girls. In the Indian census of 2001 the sex ratio in the age group 0-6 was 107.8, with
some northern states such as Punjab having ratios as high as 120-125 (Bhaskar and Gupta,
2007). In the 2000 Chinese census, the sex ratio in the age group 0-4 was 120.2, with some
regions reporting ratios of 130-135. These trends are mirrored in other Asian countries such
as South Korea and Taiwan, which have sex ratios at birth of 108 and 109 respectively. The
large increases in the sex ratios across censuses are most plausibly due to the spread of sex
1See Dasgupta (1987) on discrimination in the Punjab.
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selection techniques.2 Indeed, "gendericide" has become a matter of serious public concern.3
The marriage market consequences of these sex ratio imbalances are enormous. Our
empirical estimates suggest that in China, almost one in ve boys in recently born cohorts will
be without brides, raising fears of social disruption and instability. This raises the question,
how can such imbalances persist? Asian parents may prefer boys to girls, but surely evolution
has also endowed them with a strong desire for grandchildren. Can such sex ratios be an
equilibrium phenomenon, or do they reect myopia on the part of parents? These trends also
raise the normative question, should we allow parental sex selection? The standard response,
from governments, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations, is to deplore
sex selection, since this reects discriminatory preferences, that are based on ignorance and
backwardness. Rather than allowing choice based on such preferences, the state has a duty
to educate away such preferences. This view is squarely paternalistic, and policy is not based
upon the preferences of citizens, but on those of enlightened agencies.
An alternative view, that is less common, is that sex selection may improve the position
of girls, by raising their value as they become scarce. Dharma Kumar (1983) was an early
and trenchant proponent of this position. She asked whether selective abortions are any
worse than the neglect and infanticide of girl children, and argued that market forces will
alleviate problems arising from discriminatory preferences. However, this view does not take
into account possible externalities or market failure.
There is an enormous empirical literature on the subject of the sex ratio. Following
Amartya Sen (1990) and many demographers (e.g. Coale, 1991), economists are increasingly
contributing to this debate (see Oster, 2005; Qian, 2008; Anderson and Ray, 2009). However,
there is very little in terms of formal economic analysis of the social implications of sex ratio
imbalances arising from sex selection. Edlund (1999) examines the e¤ects of sex selection in
2For aggregate estimates of the extent of sex selective abortions in India, see Arnold et al. (2002) and
Jha et al. (2006). Portner (2010) uses micro data on birth spacing in India to estimate the hazard rates of
having a boy and a girl.
3For example, on March 6 this year, the Economists cover story was entitled "Gendericide: The worldwide
war on baby girls".
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a nite and hierarchically ordered society, and shows that the upper classes have an incentive
to have only boys, while the lower classes prefer girls. However, her work does not examine
welfare issues, and does not address the congestion externalities and possible market failures
that lie at the heart of the present paper. Her positive analysis also yields conclusions that
are di¤erent from ours, and that seem to be counter to the empirical trends for example,
with perfect sex selection, she predicts a balanced sex ratio, while our model predicts that
the sex ratio would become more unbalanced.4 Our paper is closest in spirit to evolutionary
models of the sex ratio, that date back to Darwin and R.A. Fisher (1930); however, biological
models do not allow for any concerns apart from long run genetic representation, and do not
deal with welfare issues.
Section 1 of this paper proposes a model of parental choice and the equilibrium sex
ratios in order to address these issues. An imbalance in the marriage market sex ratio
is an equilibrium consequence of gender biased preferences. At an equilibrium, the payo¤
di¤erence between having a boy and a girl will be lower than in the absence of choice. This is
mainly done by reducing the payo¤to having a boy, from reduced marriage market prospects;
the payo¤ to having a girl also rises, but to a smaller extent. In consequence, parents who
select for boys exert a congestion externality in the marriage market. Sex selection reduces
welfare, where welfare is evaluated in terms of the ex ante expected utility of the typical
parent. Technological improvements in selection that facilitate sex selection will worsen the
sex ratio and reduce welfare. Our policy recommendation is a Pigouvian subsidy to girls,
that is nanced by a tax on boys this results in a Pareto improvement.
Our conclusions are di¤erent if intrinsic gender bias is absent or mild, and if the observed
preference for boys arises endogenously, from the fact that girls nd it hard to marry. This
may arise due to the marriage squeeze the e¤ective excess supply of girls in the marriage
market, due to population growth and the fact that men marry younger women. If population
growth causes an excess supply of girls, and there is little intrinsic gender bias, then sex
4We discuss Edlunds work further in section 3, when we present our results on a class di¤erentiated
society.
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selection may improve welfare. Thus, the answer to the question, does sex selection raise or
reduce welfare depends upon empirical evidence. In China, census data shows that cohort
sizes are falling rapidly, so there is reverse marriage squeeze, and a large excess supply of
boys. Thus selection for boys is unambiguously welfare reducing. In India, the picture is
more mixed. Cohort sizes are growing, and the marriage squeeze counteracts the marriage
market consequences of biased sex ratios. There is an excess supply of boys in the North-
West of India, and in this region, sex selection appears to be welfare reducing; however,
elsewhere in the country, there is still an excess supply of girls on the marriage market.
The results of our model are robust to various extensions. As Angrist (2002) and Chiap-
pori et al. (2002) show, an excess of males on the marriage market will raise the bargaining
power of women and shift household allocations in their favour. If parents are altruistic, this
will make it more attractive for them to have girls rather than boys. They may also be able
to capture a part of these gains in the form of bride prices. Such distributional e¤ects will
reduce the magnitude of sex ratio imbalances, but our qualitative conclusions continue to
hold. We show this in section 2, in a model where dowries or intra-household allocations are
negotiated in marriage markets that are subject to search frictions. With large gender bias,
the equilibrium sex ratio is excessively biased towards boys from a social welfare standpoint,
and technological progress reduces welfare by aggravating the congestion externality.
In section 3 we consider how the incentive to select varies endogenously across social
groups, so that selection decisions in upper classes will a¤ect incentives in poorer sections.
In section 4 we consider developed societies where family gender balancing is a primary
motivation. Sex selection is increasingly possible via "acceptable" technologies, such in vitro
fertilization or preconception gender selection. Sex selection may improve individual utility;
however, even if family balancing is the primary motive, a congestion externality may arise if
preferences are not fully symmetric between the sexes, or if the costs of selection are gender
dependent. Thus society must ensure that incentives are provided to ensure gender balance
at the aggregate level. The nal section concludes. The appendix provides details of the
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formal proofs that are not dealt with in the body of the paper.
1 The equilibrium sex ratio
The standard biological model of the sex ratio dates back to the classic work of R.A Fisher
(1930), following on ideas in Darwin. Fishers model is one where a parent is concerned only
with maximizing reproductive tness, and predicts a balanced sex ratio. In equilibrium, there
is no gender bias parents are equally happy when a girl is born as when a boy is. How-
ever, human societies have been transformed enormously from the times of hunter-gatherers
when evolutionary preferences were shaped. With increased life expectancy, children are
an important source of support in old age. Thus the economic value of o¤spring, beyond
considerations of genetic representation, is also important. Di¤erent agricultural technolo-
gies a¤ord varying roles for the sexes. Boserup (1970) argued that the superior status of
women in sub-Saharan Africa relative to Asia was attributable to their greater utility in hoe-
cultivation as compared to plough-cultivation. Bardhan (1974) attributes the higher status
of women (and favorable sex ratios) in rice-growing south India, relative to wheat-growing
north India, to the fact that rice has greater use for female labor than wheat. More recently,
Qian (2008) investigates the e¤ects of the change in gender specic earnings caused by the
Chinese economic reforms, that raised the returns to female labor in tea growing regions,
and to male labor in regions with orchard fruit. She nds signicant inter-regional changes
in the sex ratio that are associated with regional cropping patterns.
Cultural factors may also reinforce son preference. For Hindus, a son is deemed essential,
since it is he who must light the funeral pyre. Confucianism assigns a pivotal role to the son-
father relationship. Economists may seek deeper explanations for these cultural phenomena;
however, these historically given preferences play a role in determining current behavior.
These considerations suggest that while concerns of reproduction are important, the
economic (and cultural) value of o¤spring is also relevant. Accordingly, we modify Fishers
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model by allowing parents to have preferences directly regarding the gender of their child.
Our primary focus is on the e¤ects of "gender-bias" in preferences, possibly arising from
di¤erences in economic value of the sexes, although we also investigate "family-balancing"
concerns in section 4. To this end, we assume that parental preferences are such that a boy is
preferred to a girl, conditional on both having the same marital status. However, a married
girl is strictly preferred to a single boy. Since marriage is uncertain, we need to consider
preferences over lotteries, and we parameterize the von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities as
follows. Let uB be the base payo¤ to the parents from having a single boy, and let uG be
the base payo¤ from having a girl. We assume that each boy is ex ante identical; however,
his quality in the marriage market is random and equals G + "; where G > 0 and " has a
continuous density on support [0; "]: Thus, any girl has a payo¤ G from marriage, and the
term " reects the idiosyncratic quality of her partners quality. Similarly, all girls are ex ante
identical, and her realized quality equals B+; where B > 0 and  has a continuous density
on support [0; ] with the same mean as ". We assume that the idiosyncratic component
of match value is small relative to the systematic component  this is stated precisely as
Assumption A1. Assume that uB + B  uG + G for most of the paper, we assume that
this inequality is strict i.e. there is son preference. Furthermore, we shall assume that a
married girl is always preferred to a single boy i.e. uB < uG + G: We assume that the
quality of the child cannot be observed at conception (although gender can), but only later,
on the marriage market. We also assume that parents evaluate matches in the same way
that their o¤spring do.
We now turn to supply and demand in the marriage market, which depend not only
on the sex ratio but also upon the rate of growth in birth cohort size. This is due to
the fact that men are, on average, older than their wives. Data from the United Nations
(1990) documents that this is true in each of over 90 countries, in each time period (between
1950 and 1985) that data is available. While an age gap at marriage may not cause any
imbalances in a stationary population, it has major social consequences when cohort sizes
6
are increasing over time, since each cohort of men is matched with a larger cohort of women.
The consequent excess supply of women has been called themarriage squeeze, and it weakens
womensposition on the marriage market. Demographers, such as Bhatt and Halli (1999),
have argued that the marriage squeeze is responsible for the deterioration of the position
of women in India, and replacement of the institution of bride price in many regions and
communities by dowries (payment from the brides family to the groom). Let g be the rate of
growth of cohort size, and let r be the sex ratio at birth (of girls relative to boys). Let  be
the age gap at marriage, assumed to be exogenous on page 11 we discuss the implications
of endogenizing  . Thus the ratio of women to men in the marriage market, r; is related
to the sex ratio at birth, r; by the equation r = r; where   (1 + g) : For expositional
simplicity, we shall focus on the case where g  1 the implications negative growth are
easily inferred from our analysis.
Our analysis focuses on a dynamic steady state equilibrium, where the sex ratios at birth
and in the marriage market are constant. In the marriage market, matching takes place
between men born at any date t and women born at t+  ; where the ratio of the measures
of the latter to the former equal r; at every date t: Marriage market matching is required to
be measure preserving, and stable, in the sense of Gale and Shapley (1962). This determines
the expected payo¤s from having a boy or a girl. Given this, sex selection decisions are taken
optimally, so that the resulting sex ratio in the marriage market equals r:
Let M be the set of men at date t and let W be the set of women at t +  : A matching
is a function  : M!W[f0g that satises the following properties. First, if w = (m); then
w is not the image of any other m0 2 M under ; i.e. any woman can be matched only to a
single man. Second, if MM, the Lebesgue measure of Mequals that of the set (M)\W:
Third, if w = (m); then both m and w prefer to be matched to each other rather than
being single. Finally, if w 6= (m); then either m prefers (m) to w or w prefers her current
match to m.
In this context, it is well known that a stable measure preserving matching is essentially
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unique, and will be positively assortative. That is, if a boy of realized quality " is matched
to a girl of realized quality ("); then
1  F (") = r[1 G(("))];
where F (:) and G(:) denote the cumulative distribution functions of " and  respectively. If
r < 1; then the lowest quality boys, i.e. a proportion 1   r; will be left unmatched. Let
"= F 1(1   r) denote the lowest quality boy that is matched in this case. If r > 1, the
lowest quality girls, of proportion 1  1
r
; will be left unmatched. Let = G 1(1  1
r
) denote
the lowest quality girl that is matched. To see that this is stable, consider a boy of type
"  "; who is matched to a girl of type (") (a similar argument can be made for each type
of girl): The only girls he prefers are those with a type  > ("); however, any such girl is
matched to a higher type boy, and will not accept his proposal. An unmatched has type
"  "; and is therefore weakly inferior, from a girls point of view, than her own match.
We now turn to the payo¤ of the parents, given this matching in the marriage market.
Since the quality of the o¤spring is unknown at the time of conception, the ex ante expected
utility of having a boy, as function of the sex ratio, is given by
U(r) =
8><>: uB + r[B + E()] if r < 1uB + B + E(j  ) if r  1 :
Similarly, the ex ante expected utility of having a girl is given by
V (r) =
8><>: uG +
1
r
[G + E(")] if r  1
uG + G + E("j"  ") if r < 1
:
Suppose now that sex selection is very costly, so that it is never exercised. We shall
assume in this paper that the natural sex ratio at birth is 1. The sex ratio in the marriage
market is given by the rate of growth of cohort size, : Thus the payo¤ di¤erence between
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having a boy and having a girl is given by
[uB + B + E(j  ]  [uG +
1

(G + E("))] > 0.
If cohort sizes are increasing, then boys are preferred to girls not only due to possible son
preference (i.e. if uB+B > uG+G) but also due to the fact that girls have poorer marriage
market prospects boys will be matched for sure and secure a higher quality partner, while
girls are matched only with probability 1

:
Let the cost of sex selection be su¢ ciently small that it will be exercised. Consider
rst the case of ex post selection, e.g. via sex selective abortions. In this case, a pregnant
mother observes the sex of foetus and can pay a cost c to have an abortion and conceive
another child. Suppose that the foetus is female, and has value V (r): By having an abortion
and trying again, the parent gets the ex ante expected utility of a child, which is given
by 1
2
fU(r) + V (r)g; minus the cost: So aborting the foetus and trying again is optimal if
U(r) V (r)g  2c; while accepting the girl child is optimal if this inequality is reversed. In
the case of in vitro fertilization, choice is exercised ex ante, before pregnancy. If the parents
select for a boy, they are assured of the certain payo¤, U(r)  c; where c now represents the
cost of in vitro fertilization. By not exercising choice, the parents get the lottery with payo¤
1
2
fU(r) + V (r)g: Thus the incentives for exercising choice are formally identical to the case
of ex post selection, even though choice is associated with the uncertain outcome in the case
of abortions, and with the certain outcome in the case of in vitro fertilization. However, the
magnitude of the cost involved in selection (c) is likely to be dramatically di¤erent in the
two cases, since in vitro fertilization is much more acceptable from a psychological, ethical
and social point of view. The analysis is easily extended to the case of imperfect ex ante
selection technologies, such as sperm selection if the probability of having a boy is p > 0:5;
then the relevant cost is 2c
2p 1 rather than 2c.
Suppose that 2c < U()   V (). It is clear that r =  cannot be an equilibrium, since
the value of trying again is greater than the cost. At the unique equilibrium, the sex ratio
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r must be interior (i.e. in (0; 1)), so it must be the case that a parent is indi¤erent between
accepting a girl child and trying again. This gives us the basic indi¤erence condition:
U(r)  V (r) = 2c: (1)
The intuition for this condition is straightforward: by exercising choice when one has a
girl, a parent gets an improvement in value from V (r) to U(r); with probability one half:
Indi¤erence requires that the expected value of this equals the cost c:
Consider rst a society where  > 1; so that there is population growth but where gender
bias in preferences is mild or non-existent so that (uB+B) (uG+G) < 2c: The equilibrium
sex ratio in the marriage market, r; must be greater one in the absence of signicant gender
bias. To see this, observe that when the marriage market is balanced, U(1) V (1)  2c < 0;
so that it is not worthwhile to select for boys. However, selection for boys must take place
if the sex ratio is to fall below ; and the indi¤erence condition (1) must be satised: Thus,
the equilibrium sex ratio in the marriage market, r; must exceed one, while the sex ratio at
birth, r; will be less than one.
Now let us consider a society where there is signicant gender bias in preferences, so
that (uB + B)   (uG + G) > 2c: In this case, parents will prefer to select for boys when
the marriage market is balanced. Thus the equilibrium sex ratio, r; must be less than one,
and selection will aggravate the imbalance in the marriage market due to population growth
rather than alleviating it.
To summarize: if cohort sizes are growing, costly sex selection will alleviate the imbalance
in the marriage market, but not entirely eliminate it, if parental gender preferences are
unbiased or if the bias is relatively mild. However, if there is signicant gender bias in
preferences, there is an oversupply of boys in the marriage market. Our analysis also shows
that no matter whether we have large gender bias or not, the equilibrium marriage market
sex ratio r does not depend upon the rate of population growth, . This is clear from the
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indi¤erence condition (1) neither U(r) nor V (r) depend upon .5 This implies that the
sex ratio at birth adjusts to variations in ; so as to keep r invariant:
Wemay also ask, what is the implication of the proportion of boys in births being di¤erent
from 0:5? This is relevant, since the natural ratio at birth in appears to be around 0.94 or
0.95, and mortality data show that this excess of boys is not o¤set by di¤erential mortality in
the case of India and China (see Anderson and Ray, 2010). It is also relevant in the context
of the argument by Oster (2005) that hepatitis B infection raises the probability of having
a boy. 6 We now show that the behavioral response by parents to natural variations in the
sex ratio at birth may completely o¤set it. Let p denote the probability of having a boy, as
assessed by the parents. The equilibrium marriage market sex ratio r depends only on the
assessed p; and via the indi¤erence condition, which must be re-written as U(r) V (r) = c
p
:
It is plausible that parents di¤er in their extent of son preference, and also to the degree to
which they value grandchildren. If the preference parameters (uB; uG; B; G; c) were drawn
for each parent according to continuous atomless distribution, then some parents (e.g. those
with high gender bias) would choose for sure to have boys, while others would accept a girl.
Thus, almost all parents would have strict incentives to follow their equilibrium strategies,
but the aggregate sex ratio would be interior. Moreover, if the heterogeneity is small, the
equilibrium sex ratio is close to that in the society without heterogeneity. This corresponds,
essentially, to a Harsanyi-style purication (Harsanyi, 1973) of the equilibrium considered
here.
We have assumed that the age gap in marriage,  ; is xed. Bhaskar (2010) analyzes how
the age gap corresponding to a Gale-Shapley style stable matching responds to variations
in population growth, g. Suppose that men and women have single-peaked preferences over
the age gap at marriage, with men having an ideal age gap B > 0; while the womensideal
5This is subject to the caveat that we are at an equilibrium with selection; otherwise (i.e. when there is
little gender bias and when  is small), this is not true, since r = :
6This has been questioned by a number of authors, and qualied by Oster herself. Most compelling are
the ndings of Lin and Luoh (2008). They use Taiwanese data on the mothers hepatitis B status at the time
of pregnacy, and nd that this does not contribute signicantly to explaining imbalances in the sex ratio at
birth.
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gap is G > 0: With non-transferable utility, the equilibrium age gap  will equal the ideal
point of the short side of the market. That is, it will be equal to B if there is excess supply
of women in the marriage market, and G if there is an excess supply of men. If the marriage
market is balanced, then there can be multiple equilibria, with  taking any value between
the two ideal points. Thus our assumption that  is xed corresponds to the case where
G = B: If the ideal points di¤er, then the age gap is relatively insensitive to changes in the
sex ratio, since it changes only when market conditions change from excess supply to excess
demand. More generally, it is not the case that the age gap adjusts to reduce excess supply
in the marriage market. If gender bias is large, there will be excess supply of men in the
marriage market, and the equilibrium age gap will be G: There is an indirect e¤ect of the
endogeneity of  upon r women get a higher payo¤ since  = B, so that V (r) is larger;
and men get a lower payo¤, i.e. a lower U(r): This increases the equilibrium sex ratio r:
Similarly, in the absence of gender bias, there will be an excess supply of women due to the
marriage squeeze, and this means that  = B: This has direct e¤ects on r and, indirectly,
a negative e¤ect on r by raising mens payo¤s and reducing womens.
1.1 Welfare implications
Let us now examine the welfare implications of parental choice. The literature on sex selec-
tion in societies with gender bias has assumed that sex selection is immoral per se. Indeed,
sex selective abortions have been termed "genocide" or "gendericide". This however begs
several question. In the societies under discussion (e.g. India or China), abortion is legal and
also morally acceptable, implying that these societies do not endow the foetus with an un-
conditional "right to life". If this is indeed the case, then why are selective abortions deemed
immoral? Even if society is able to prevent sex selective abortions, it cannot ensure that the
unwanted girls are loved and taken care of. Furthermore, newer selection technologies such
as in vitro fertilization or preconception gender selection are less open to absolutist moral
objections. In this paper, we assume a non-paternalistic welfare evaluation, and consider the
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welfare of the individual parent. Since all parents are ex ante identical (before the realization
of the sex of their child), we take as our welfare criterion the expected ex ante utility of a
typical parent this also equals the sum of realized utilities of the parents in this society.
Thus welfare, as a function of the sex ratio r; is given by
W (r) =
1
1 + r
U(r) +
r
1 + r
V (r)  c1  r
1 + r
: (2)
That is, a proportion 1
1+r
of parents have boys, and get utility U(r); while the remainder
have girls and utility V (r): The third term is the cost associated with changing the sex ratio
at birth from 1 to r: Suppose that the social planner can choose the level of r; and consider
how she might choose in order to maximize welfare function we shall see that tax/subsidy
schemes can serve as instruments. The derivative of welfare with respect to r equals
W 0(r) =
[V (r) + 2c  U(r)] + (1 + r)[U 0(r) + rV 0(r)]
(1 + r)2
(3)
U(r) and V (r) are di¤erentiable everywhere except at r = 1; with derivatives :
U 0(r) =
8><>: B + E(") if r < 1E[j] 
r
if r > 1
:
V 0(r) =
8><>:
" E["j""]
r
if r < 1
 G+E()
r2
if r > 1
:
If r < 1; then an increase in r raises male utility by increasing the probability that a boy
nds a partner. It also reduces female utility, since lower quality males are also matched;
however, since the idiosyncratic component of match quality is assumed to be small relative
to B; the positive e¤ect on males outweighs the negative e¤ect on females. Similarly, when
r > 1; a reduction in r has a positive e¤ect on females, which is greater in absolute value
than the negative e¤ect on males.
Consider the derivative of welfare with respect to r, (3), evaluated at the equilibrium
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r: The rst term in the numerator equals zero, since the indi¤erence condition (1) holds at
equilibrium. Thus, the sign of the derivative equals that of U 0(r) + rV 0(r); evaluated at r:
This depends upon whether r is less than or greater than one, and given by
[U 0(r) + rV 0(r)]jr=r =
8><>: B + E()) 
E["j""] "

> 0 if r < 1
1
r
n
E(j  )     G+E(")

o
< 0 if r > 1
:
If we assume that the idiosyncratic component of value (" or ) is small relative to the
systematic component G or B, then the derivative will be positive when r
 < 1 and negative
when r > 1: Thus, if r < 1; then welfare is increasing in r; while if r is greater than one,
welfare is decreasing in r: In the appendix we show that the global welfare optimum is at
r = 1; so that if a social planner could control the extent of sex selection, she would aim
for a sex ratio at birth that corresponds to a balanced marriage market. This requires an
additional assumption, A1, that the idiosyncratic component on preferences is small relative
to the average payo¤ of a boy or a girl, and that population growth is not extremely large.
Assumption A1: "  (B+E());   +1 2 (G+E(")) and 1+(1+g) > (1+g)2 :
Our results show gender bias results in a male biased sex ratio on the marriage market,
and this is ine¢ cient. The intuition for this ine¢ ciency is as follows. Consider an equilibrium
r < 1, and a parent who is selecting for a boy. If this parent decides not to select, she su¤ers
no loss in payo¤, since she is indi¤erent between selecting and not selecting at r: However,
the decision not to exercise choice has a positive e¤ect, since at the aggregate level, two more
boys will nd partners for sure. That is, there is a congestion externality in the marriage
market which is not taken into account by parents who select.
However, selection has positive welfare e¤ects in societies without large gender bias,
by reducing the marriage market imbalance due to population growth and the age gap at
marriage. In this case, selection exerts a positive externality, by reducing congestion. Here
again, parents do not take this externality into account, and as a result, the equilibrium
results in an unbalanced marriage market sex ratio, with too many girls.
14
Our welfare results have been obtained even though we take as our welfare criterion the
expected utility of the typical parent, who may well have gender biased preferences. If we
were to take into account the utility of the children, and use a utilitarian social welfare
function, this would only reinforce our conclusions, since we may assume that girls do not
have a preference to be boys instead. Thus the welfare gains from a balanced sex ratio would
be larger in this case.
Assumption A1 is needed for the welfare results for two reasons. First, the idiosyncratic
component of match value must be small enough relative to the systematic component 
otherwise, it is possible that as women become scarce, their match value improves very
greatly, by more than the loss su¤ered by men. Second, the sex ratio in the marriage market
(r) is what determines mens and womens payo¤s in the marriage market, while the weights
of these utilities in the utilitarian social welfare function W depends upon r; the sex ratio at
birth. If  = (1 + g) is very large, then women have a relatively large weight in the welfare
function, and so then an unbalanced sex ratio that favours them would be better than a
balanced one. However, one needs implausibly high values of  for this to be the case. 7
We now consider the implications of changes in c upon equilibrium welfare, at an interior
equilibrium where the indi¤erence condition (1) is satised. Let W (c) denote equilibrium
welfare as a function of c; i.e., W (c)  W (r(c)): Since it is optimal at r for a parent to
accept the child that nature deals her, this can be written as
W (c) = 0:5fU(r(c)) + V (r(c))g:
Since the di¤erence between U(r) and V (r) equals 2c; this can be re-written as
W (c) = V (r(c)) + c:
7The condition in A1 is satised as long as  < 1+
p
5
2 ' 1:6. No society appears to have such a large
value of   for example, even with large rates of growth in cohort size in parts of India, this number is no
more than 1.2.
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From the indi¤erence condition that determines r; dr

dc
= 2
U 0(r) V 0(r) ; so that the e¤ect of
welfare equals
dW 
dc
= 1 +
2V 0(r)
U 0(r)  V 0(r) :
V 0(r) < 0 and U 0(r) > 0; and so the second term is negative. Thus the e¤ect on welfare
of an increase in cost is positive when jV 0(:)j < jU 0(:)j and negative otherwise. So when
r < 1; since jV 0(:)j < jU 0(:)j ; an increase in c increases welfare, since the equilibrium sex
ratio becomes more balanced. In other words, technological progress, that makes selective
abortions easier, reduces welfare, if the equilibrium sex ratio already has an excess of boys.
On the other hand, if r > 1; a reduction in c makes the sex ratio more balanced, and thus
increases welfare.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If there is large son preference ((uB + B)  (uG + G) > 2c), sex selection
biases the equilibrium sex ratio, and results in a socially ine¢ cient outcome, with too many
boys. If there is little or no son preference ((uB + B)  (uG + G) < 2c), and the marriage
market imbalance is due to population growth and the age gap at marriage, then sex selection
increases welfare, and is insu¢ cient at the equilibrium, since there is an excess supply of girls
on the marriage market. In either case, social welfare is maximized when the sex ratio in the
marriage market is balanced, provided that assumption A1 is satised. Technological progress
that reduces the cost of selection, c; reduces welfare if the marriage market equilibrium has
an excess of boys; it raises welfare if there is an excess of girls.
An advantage of our welfare results are that they are global, and only require knowing
whether the marriage market has an excess of boys or girls. That is, they do not require
assuming that the existing sex ratio is an equilibrium one. It may be plausibly argued that
the recent increases in the sex ratio in China and parts of India are not an equilibrium phe-
nomenon, in the sense that parents may have incorrect expectations regarding the aggregate
sex ratio and future marriage prospects. Learning models suggest that societies will be able
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to learn rational expectations equilibria in stable environments; however, recent technologi-
cal developments have been so rapid that one cannot assume that expectations are rational.
Nevertheless, we may conclude that selection is welfare reducing if the marriage market has
an excess of boys (and is welfare improving otherwise). Thus if expectational errors result
in an over-reaction of the sex ratio, the adverse welfare e¤ects of selection are aggravated.
1.2 Empirical Evidence
Proposition 1 implies that the answer to question, is sex selection welfare reducing or not,
is an empirical one. In particular, we need to examine whether marriage markets in the
countries where sex selection is prevalent are characterized by an excess of men, or an excess
of women. To investigate this empirically, we modify the basic identity linking the sex ratio
at birth, r; and that in the marriage market, r, as follows
r  r(1 + g)G
B
G
B
;
where B is the survival rate for boys, between infancy and the age of marriage, and G
is that for girls. G is the proportion of girls who marry, while B is the proportion of boys
who marry.8 Thus if the marriage market is to be balanced, r must be close to or equal to
one, i.e. variations in (1+g) G
B
G
B
and r must o¤set each other. Put di¤erently, if the ratio
of boys to girls at birth equals (1 + g) G
B
G
B
; then the marriage market will be balanced.
Thus we present our gures in terms of the required number of boys, R; per 100 girls, where
R = 100(1 + g)
G
B
G
B
:
The sex ratio at birth/early infancy gives us the actual number of boys per 100 girls, A:
8This is valid if G and B are the proportions who desire marriage. However, in empirical work,
demographers use the observed proportions, and we have some reservations about this, since the actual
proportions of women and men that marry will reect marriage market conditions, i.e. will be endogenous.
As we shall see, our substantive conclusions are not much a¤ected by this adjustment.
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In consequence, the di¤erence A R measures the extent to which there missing girls in the
marriage market.9
Table 1 presents our computations of R and A; based on recently born cohorts in the
censuses of 2000 (China) and 2001 (India). For China, we present gures for the overall
population, the majority Han population (who comprise almost 90% of the population) and
for the minorities. India is more linguistically and culturally heterogeneous, and we therefore
present gures for the major geographical regions.10 Column 1 is an estimate of g; the rate
of growth of cohort size. In China, the 2000 census provides data on population numbers by
age, and we base our estimate of g on a regression of cohort size upon age, between the ages
of 2 and 8, in 2000 census. In the case of India, the data is less detailed, and our estimate
of g is based on growth rate of population aged between 0 and 6 between the censuses of
1991 and 2001. Column 2 reports the age gap at marriage,  this is the di¤erence between
singulate mean ages at marriage for men and women, taken for China from United Nations
(2003), and for India from the census report (1991b). To allow for mortality di¤erences
between males and females until marriage, we use the estimates of age and gender specic
mortality in Anderson and Ray (Table 2, 2010). These estimates imply that the survival
probability of females in China between ages 5 and 24 is 0.980, while that of males is 0.963,
so that G
B
= 1:017: For India, the survival probability of females between ages 5 and 19 is
0.937, while that of males between ages 5 and 24 is 0.926, implying that G
B
= 1:012:11 Thus
mortality di¤erences between the sexes have quantitatively small e¤ects on the sex ratio in
the marriage market, even though it may have a large e¤ect on the absolute numbers of
missing women. Since these mortality estimates are not available region-wise for India, or
9In the demography literature, Akers (1977) and Schoen (1983) set out methods for computing marriage
market imbalances.
10We have also computed these gures at state level (this is probably most appropriate for the marriage
market, given that states are oganized on a linguistic basis), but do not present these for reasons of space.
11We consider di¤erential mortality after age 5 since our sex ratio data pertains to the age cohort 0-4 in
the case of China and 0-6 in the case of India. Anderson and Ray provide mortality estimates in 5 year
intervals; since the age gap in India is 4.6 years, we consider age 24 for men and 19 for women. Since the
age gap is less than 2 years in China, we consider the same time intervals for both sexes. We also do not
make any adjustment for polygyny, since this is quantitatively insignicant in both China and India.
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separately for Han and minority groups in China, we use the aggregate estimates. Columns
3 and 4 report the singles rate. Column 5 reports our estimates of R; the required number of
boys per hundred girls the gures in brackets for India are computed by reducing the age
gap  by one year. Column 6 reports A;the actual number of boys males per 100 girls. The
nal column reports the gap between required and actual number of males per 100 females,
with the bracketed gures for India corresponding to an age gap that is reduced by one
year. 12
The results of Table 1 are striking. In China, cohort sizes are shrinking rapidly, at 5%
per annum. This is so even though population growth is positive, at 0.6% per annum.
Even with a small age gap at marriage, of 1.8 years, this results in a large reverse marriage
squeeze, and the required number of boys per 100 girls is only 96.4, even though men have
a substantially larger singles rate than women (if they had the same singles rate, then the
required number of boys would be only 92.7). However, the actual sex at birth/infancy shows
a large excess of boys, with 120 boys per 100 girls. This combination, of the unbalanced sex
ratio and reverse marriage squeeze, implies that the marriage market of the future will have
23.6 extra boys per 100 girls. This is enormous almost one in ve boys amongst those
born around the year 2000 will not nd a partner in future. Since 37 million boys were in
the age group 0-4, over 7 million of them would be doomed to remain single. In the age
group 0-9, over 16 million are be predicted to remain single.
The situation in India is very di¤erent from China. Despite the slowdown in population
growth in recent years to less than 1.5% per annum, cohort sizes are growing at more than
double that rate, at 3.4% per annum. Coupled with a large age gap at marriage, of 4.6 years,
this implies that the required number of boys is quite large 119 per 100 girls. Since the
actual sex ratio is less than 108, this implies that one in ten girls will be unmatched. Thus,
12We have not made an adjustment for the extent of polygyny, since this appears to be negligible in
both countries. For China, see United Nations (1990). In India, polygamy is legal on only for Muslims;
amongst Hindus, it has been illegal since the Hindu Marrriage Act of 1955, and data on its incidence relate
to marriages formed prior to this date. Since Muslims form 12% of the population, and since the incidence
of polygamy is estimated at 4.3%, this reduces the required number of men by one-half of a man.
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despite the large number of missing women in the population stock, the marriage market
shows a very di¤erent picture.
Since India is linguistically heterogeneous, and since intermarriage across regions is very
limited, we conduct the same analysis at a more disaggregated level. To this end, we look
at six major geographical regions. In the North-West of the country, there are highly male
biased sex ratios, with 122 boys per 100 girls, and here we have a signicant excess supply
of boys, of 10 per 100 girls. However, in all the other regions of India, we nd that there is
a signicant excess supply of girls in the marriage market. This is particularly large in the
Southern states, due both to the fact that the sex ratio at birth is more favorable in these
states, and due to the larger age gap at marriage in the South as compared to the North.
Our gures for the age gap at marriage are based on the di¤erence between the singulate
mean ages at marriage of men and women. This measures the age gap in the stock of married
individuals, rather than in the ow of current marriages, and is the standard measure used
by demographers. The age gap at marriage is declining in India over a twenty year period,
the age gap fell by 1.2 years. In order to take into account the possibility that the gap may
decline further with modernization and the education of women, we also compute R and
A R assuming that the age gap is reduced by one year these estimates are the gures in
brackets in columns 5 and 7. The has the e¤ect of mitigating somewhat the excess supply
of women but does not a¤ect our qualitative conclusions there is an excess of men in the
North-West of India, and an excess of women in the rest of the country.
The age gap at marriage, the rate of growth of cohort size, and the actual sex ratio at
birth are the most factors, quantitatively, in determining marriage market balance. The
other factors are quantitatively less important. The lower mortality rate for females adds
one extra boy to R in the case of India, and 2 in the case of China. The higher marriage
rate for women adds half an extra boy to R in the case of India for China it adds 4.
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Table 1: Required & Actual Number of Boys per 100 Girls
g  % single,F % single,M required # boys # boys gap
China (total) -5.0 1.8 0.2 4.0 96.4 120.2 +23.8
China (Han) -5.4 1.8 0.2 4.0 95.7 121.2 +25.5
China (non Han) -2.6 1.8 0.2 4.0 100.9 112.8 +11.9
India (total) 3.4 4.6 0.9 1.6 118.7 (114.8) 107.8  10:9 (7.0)
West 4.3 4.5 0.1 1.4 123.9 (118.8) 110.6  13.3 (8.2)
Central 3.5 3.8 0.5 2.2 117.4 (113.5) 108.3  9:1 (5.2)
South 2.8 5.5 1.3 1.1 117.5 (114.3) 105.0  12:5 (9.3)
East 2.6 5.0 0.8 1.4 116.8 (112.9) 105.1  11:7 (7.8)
North East 1.5 5.6 1.6 1.8 110.1 (108.5) 103.6  6:5 (4.9)
North West 2.9 2.8 0.1 2.3 112.2 (109.1) 122.2 +10.0 (13.1)
Notes: g : in China, based on a regression of cohort size upon age (between 2 and 8) in 2000 census. in
India, based growth rate of population age 0-6 between censuses of 1991 and 2001.  : di¤erence between
singulate mean ages at marriage for men and women. China: data from United Nations, 2003. India: Census
report (1991b). Column 5 and 7 gures in brackets are with  adjusted down by 1 year. Singles rates for
India computed from 2001 census from the proportion "never married" in the age-cohort 50-54; for China
from UN, 2003.
Our empirical ndings, both for China and India, are based on a very simple methodology.
Nevertheless, they appear to be novel, and to deliver new conclusions. since they based on
the rates of growth of cohort size. Neelakantan and Tertilt (2008) take into account the fact
that marriage market sex ratios di¤er from those at birth, due to the age gap at marriage.
They compute marriage market balance based on population growth gures. These however
di¤er considerably from cohort size growth, for both India and China, and the di¤erence
is magnied due to compounding over the age gap. For example, in the case of India, the
rate of growth of cohort size is twice as large as population growth (3.4% as compared to
1.4%). In the case of China, population growth is still positive (0.6% per annum), while
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cohort sizes are falling very rapidly indeed (5% per annum). To a rst approximation, the
current rate of growth of cohort size, g; changes due to two factors: changes in fertility and
the rate of growth of cohort size s years ago, where s is the age at which women are fertile.
This explains why g is so large today in India even though fertility has declined, g reects
the rapid expansion in cohorts 20-25 years ago. In China, this implies that g is likely to
continue to be negative even if the one-child policy is relaxed, reecting the past impact of
the policy in the 1980s and 1990s.
This evidence implies that sex selection has adverse social consequences in China, so
that the current Chinese policy banning sex selective abortions may be well motivated.
India also has a ban, and this may have foundation for the North West. However, a ban
seems unworkable, since it is impossible to verify that a sex selective abortion has indeed
taken place. However, there are alternative Pigouvian balanced budget tax-transfers that
can incentivize parents to have girls. These would work by increase the value of girls to
parents while reducing that of boys, e.g. via di¤erential school fees or by explicit subsidies.
Suppose that the government subsidizes each girl by an amount sG; and taxes each boy an
amount tB: If the levels of these are set so that uB+B tB 2c = uG+G+sG; then parents
will be indi¤erent between boys and girls when the sex ratio in the marriage market is one.
Since budget balance can be ensured by setting tB = sG; we have balanced budget tax
subsidies that result in a Pareto improvement, and can ensure the socially optimal outcome.
Policy makers have recently taken steps in this direction for example, on 3 March 2008
IANS reported that "in a move to stop female feticide and stabilize the skewed sex ratio, the
Indian government announced an insurance cover for poor families with girl children that will
see incentives at every step - when she is given vaccinations, sent to school and not married
o¤ before 18...The scheme would be rst started in seven educationally backward states as
a pilot project and later extended to the entire nation." However, this scheme seems partly
motivated by redistributive considerations, since it was introduced mainly in the poorest
regions in the country, where male biased sex ratios are not a serious issue only one of the
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pilot regions is located in the North-West. Furthermore, as we shall see in section 3, there
are theoretical reasons why selection for boys will be more signicant in the upper classes
than among the poor. Thus well designed tax-transfers, that are targeted to address the
congestion externality directly, have yet to be introduced.
2 Dowries and the sex ratio
A shortage of women in the marriage market is likely to improve their bargaining power and
their share of household resources (Becker, 1981). Angrist (2002) nds that a reduction in
the sex ratio r in immigrant marriage markets in the US reduces the labor supply of women
and raises that of men. Chiappori et al. (2002) estimate a structural model of distributional
e¤ects and nd that a reduction in r reduces womens labor supply and increases their share
of household resources, while raising the labor supply of men. These distributional e¤ects
have implications for parental selection decisions. If parents are altruistic, they will take into
account the e¤ects of the sex ratio upon the utility of their child. Parents whose children
are on the short side of the market may also be able to capture a portion of these scarcity
rents in the form of bride prices or dowries. Finally, these changes in the sex ratio may alter
existing social norms and relations between children and their parents. It has been argued
that parents prefer sons in India and China since traditionally sons support their parents
in old age while daughters do not. If the bargaining power of daughters increases within
the marriage, they may have a greater say on the pattern of inter-generational transfers and
these norms may change.13
To model these e¤ects, we now assume transferable utility, and allow transfers between
spouses to be negotiated between the parties at the time of marriage. These transfers can
be interpreted either as dowries/bride prices, or as the capitalized value of ows over the
life-time of the relationship. As Lundberg and Pollak (2003), latter interpretation assumes
13A caveat is in order here since support for aged parents takes place many years after the marriage, it
may be hard for commitments at the time of marriage to be enforced.
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that commitments at the time of the marriage are binding.
Consider rst a steady state equilibrium where the marriage market is Walrasian. For
simplicity, we assume that there is no idiosyncratic component to quality, i.e. " and  are
both identically zero. Our focus is on a rational expectations equilibrium, where parents
make their initial choices (regarding gender) anticipating a bride price, that in turn equals
the realized bride price. Let t denote the transfer from boys to girls, i.e. the bride price 
in principle, this depends : In a Walrasian market, the marginal agent on the long side must
be indi¤erent between marrying at the market price and staying single. So t = B if r < 1
and t =  G if r > 1:If r = 1; then any t 2 [ G; B] is a market clearing price. Let us now
consider a rational expectations equilibrium, where parents at each date correctly forecast a
t; and where the choices they exercise results in a sex ratio r such that t is a Walrasian
price given r: The only steady state sex ratio that can a rational expectations equilibrium
is r = 1: To see this, suppose that r < 1; so that t = B: In this case, any parent who has
a girl strictly prefers not to select for a boy, since the payo¤ from the girl is uG + G + B;
which is strictly greater than uB. Similarly, one cannot have r > 1: A balanced sex ratio
with r = 1 can be supported by a bride price t that satises
(uB   uG)  2c
2
 t  (uB   uG) + 2c
2
:
In view of our ndings in Table 1 of large sex ratio imbalances, the Walrasian model
yields the empirically implausible conclusion that the marriage market sex ratio is always
balanced. Intuitively, the Walrasian model assumes that any small deviation from sex ratio
balance results in a discontinuous jump in transfers. This also seems inconsistent with
the empirical evidence cited above (Angrist (2002) and Chiappori et al. (2002)), that nds
continuous e¤ects of sex ratios upon household allocations.
To ensure that transfers vary continuously with the sex ratio, we embed the bargaining
process in a marriage market subject to search frictions that denes the outside options of the
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parties. Consider an innite horizon continuous time model, where uB and uG now represent
ow payo¤s from having a boy and a girl respectively, and i denotes the interest rate. Let 
be the ow payo¤ from marriage for each partner.14 Let t be the net transfer of household
resources from the man to the woman  a negative value of t corresponds to a transfer
from the woman to the man. Let (t) be the value to the woman of this transfer. Perfect
transferability corresponds to the case where (t) = t; while under imperfect transferability,
(t) is strictly concave, with (0) = 0 and 0(0) = 1:We shall also assume that both partners
are able to make binding commitments regarding the division of the payo¤ for the duration
of the marriage.15 Parents take into account the e¤ects of the transfers, so that the value to
a parent, from a married boy, and a married girl, are given by:
Um =
uB +   t
i
;
V m =
uG + + (t)
i
:
At any instant, there are stocks of unmarried boys and unmarried girls, of measures  and
x respectively, so that x denotes the sex ratio in the stocks. We shall assume that matches
arrive according to a Poisson process, where the arrival rate is increasing in both stocks,
di¤erentiable and a symmetric function of its arguments. We also assume constant returns
to scale so that the analysis maybe conducted in terms of x; the sex ratio, without reference
to absolute market size : Let (x) (resp. (x)) denote the arrival rate of matches for a
girl (resp. boy), where (x)  x (x) : (x) is strictly increasing in x; while (x) is strictly
14For simplicity, we assume that there is no idiosyncratic component to match value  our analysis
extends, at the cost of additional notational burden, to the where idiosyncratic component is small relative
to search frictions. Our assumption that the payo¤ from marriage is the same for both parties is without
loss of generality if there is perfect transferability of utility.
15The importance of commitment power has been emphasized by several authors, e.g. Lundberg and
Pollak (2003). In the absence of commitment, the results will be similar to the model without transfers,
unless parties are able to capitalize future transfers at the time of marriage, in the form of bride prices or
dowries.
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decreasing. Finally, we shall assume that matching becomes more e¢ cient if the market
is more balanced, i.e. the number of matches per unit population is single peaked, with a
maximum at x = 1:The values of a single boy and a single girl depend upon the sex ratio x
and upon the prevailing transfer t; and are
U(x; t) =
uB
i
+

i( + i)
(B   t):
V (x; t) =
uG
i
+

i(+ i)
(G + (t)):
The transfer t, from the boy to the girl, is determined by Nash bargaining between the
two parties. That is the equilibrium transfer t is given by the Nash bargaining solution
where the outside options are given by the values to remaining single, U(x; t) and U(x; t):16
Now, in an equilibrium, the negotiated transfer between the matched pair, t; must itself be
equal to the prevailing transfer in the market: This allows us to solve for t as a function of
x; and this is dened implicitly by the condition
+ (t)
  t =
(x) + i
(x) + i
: (4)
Let ~U(x) = U(x; t(x)), and ~V (x) = V (x; t(x)) denote the value of singles as a function
of x alone, given that t = t(x). We can now determine the equilibrium sex ratio in the
stock, x: This must be such that di¤erence in values between boys and girls at the time of
birth equals the expected cost of selection:
~U(x)  ~V (x) = 2c: (5)
We now turn to the relation between the sex ratio in stocks and that in the ow of births.
16Alternatively, we could assume that the outside options constrain the bargaining solution, but do not
otherwise a¤ect it. The specication we have chosen allows the maximal e¤ect of the sex ratio upon the
bride price. Alternative specications would only make the equilibrium more ine¢ cient.
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Assume that the ow of new births is exogenously given at g; let  be the fraction of births
that are girls, and let the instantaneous death rate be : In a steady state the sex ratio in
the stock must be stationary, giving us the relation
(x) =
g + (x)(x  1)
2g
:
The equilibrium sex ratio in the ow of births is given by (x): Note that (x) equals 1
at x = 1 and is less than one if x < 1:
We show rst that the equilibrium sex ratio x must be less than 1 if uB   uG > 2ci:
For if this is the case, then at x = 1; ~U(1)   ~V (1) = uB uG
i
(since the matching function
is symmetric, (x) = (x) when x = 1) and thus it is optimal to try again on having a
girl. However, the sex ratio will be less biased towards boys than in the absence of transfers.
Furthermore, the sex ratio will be less biased the greater the degree of transferability of
utility, i.e. the closer (t) is to being linear.
Consider now the implications of population growth and the age gap at marriage. We
may model this by assuming that the proportion of the ow of girls, in the absence of
selection, ^; is greater than one-half. In the absence of selection, the sex ratio in the stock
will be x^ =  1(^) > 1: The corresponding equilibrium transfer, t(x^); is given by equation
(4), and will be negative if x^ > 1; thus marriage squeeze results in positive groom prices
or dowries: t is a decreasing function of x^ (see appendix), implying that if the marriage
squeeze intensies, this increases the level of dowries. This provides an explanation for the
increase in dowries in the twentieth century in India, and their spread to parts of the country
where they were not prevalent.17 It is important to clarify that an increase in population
growth will raise dowries in a continuous way in a frictional market since there has been
some controversy in the literature. Anderson (2007)) argues that the marriage squeeze
17Sociologists and demographers (e.g. Bhatt and Halli (1999)) have argued that dowry payments from
the parents of girls have spread to parts of India where they were not prevalent, and have also increased in
magnitude. Since dowry payments are illegal in India, systematic evidence on the magnitude of dowries is
di¢ cult to nd (for some partial evidence, see Rao (1993)).
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cannot cause dowry ination, but considers only a one-o¤ increase in population, which then
returns to its stationary level this cannot cause a permanent increase in dowries. Also,
she assumes perfect matching and transferable utility, and in such a world, the e¤ect of
sustained population growth on dowries would be discontinuous there is a jump increase
when population growth becomes positive, and no further increase with further rises in
population growth, since dowries are already at their maximal level.
If x^ > 1; ~V (x^) < ~U(x^): If c is su¢ ciently small, it is optimal to select for boys. Thus the
equilibrium sex ratio x must satisfy the indi¤erence condition (5). Consider now the case
where gender bias is mild or absent, i.e. uB   uG > 2ci: In equilibrium, the payo¤ of boys
must exceed the payo¤ of girls, so that that x > 1: The sex ratio in the marriage market
is therefore biased against girls. Here again, the sensitivity of intra-household allocations or
dowries to the sex ratio implies less bias than in the absence of such transfers.
Turning to welfare, the expected welfare of the parent is given by
W (x) = (1  (x)) ~U(x) + (x) ~V (x)  (1  2)c:
The derivative of welfare with respect to x equals
W 0(x) =
n
(1  ) ~U 0(x) +  ~V 0(x)
o
+
n
0(x)[V ~(x) + 2c  ~U(x)]
o
: (6)
The rst term in curly brackets is the "match e¢ ciency e¤ect" how the (weighted) sum of
the utilities of the two sexes responds to x:Match e¢ ciency is concave in x and maximized at
x = 1; i.e. when the market is balanced (see appendix). The second term in curly brackets
is (a positive multiple of) the private benet from accepting a girl as compared to trying
again. Thus this term is strictly negative when x > x and strictly positive if the inequality
is reversed. This decomposition of equation (6) gives us two immediate results. Consider
rst the case of signicant gender bias, so that x < 1: The equilibrium outcome is socially
ine¢ cient, with the sex ratio being too low, since at x; the second term is zero, and thus
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W 0 (x)jx=x > 0: The social optimum x
 lies between x and 1; since at 1 the rst term is
zero and the second term is negative implying that W 0 (x)jx=1 < 0:We conclude therefore
that welfare is increasing in x at x; i.e. the equilibrium proportion of girls is too low from a
welfare point of view. Parental choice results in an ine¢ cient outcome, with too many boys,
since parents do not internalize the congestion externality in the marriage market.
In the case where there is little or no gender bias, and population growth so that x >
1; the social optimum x will be smaller than x; so that there is too little selection in
equilibrium. Thus the main ndings of our model of section 1 appear to be robust.
With frictional matching social optimality does not require r = 1. From equation (6),
at x = 1 the match e¢ ciency term is zero but the private benet term is negative, and so
welfare is decreasing in x: The welfare optimal level of x lies between x and 1.18
Our results here are related to the literature on job creation in search models of unem-
ployment, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). This literature nds that job creation is
typically ine¢ cient, although the direction of the ine¢ ciency is ambiguous there maybe too
few or too many jobs. The di¤erence is, in our context of parental choice, a child may enter
on either side of the market either as a boy or as a girl. The preference for boys over girls,
coupled with the symmetry of the bargaining situation, permits an unambiguous conclusion
welfare increases by making the market more balanced. In particular, with large gender
bias, the equilibrium has too many boys, relative to the welfare optimum. In the job cre-
ation literature, Hosios (1990) has shown that appropriate assignment of bargaining power
between the two sides can ensure an e¢ cient allocation. In the present context, when there
is large gender bias, e¢ ciency requires that women have greater bargaining power than men,
even when marriage markets are balanced. This seems somewhat unlikely given the inferior
status of women in traditional societies. In an illuminating study on India, Bloch and Rao
18This is the one qualitative nding of the basic model of section 1 that appears not to be robust With
frictionless matching, match e¢ ciency is a non-di¤erentiable function of the sex ratio, r; since the number of
matches is equals the short side of the market. Thus the loss in match e¢ ciency is rst-order in 1  r: With
frictions, the loss in match e¢ ciency is of second order in the di¤erence (1   r); implying that the optimal
sex ratio is below 1:
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(2002) show that married men use domestic violence in order to extract additional payments
from their in-laws. The irreversibility of marriage in traditional societies, in conjunction with
the vulnerability of women within marriage, may move e¤ective bargaining power towards
men. Such an asymmetry would only aggravate the ine¢ ciency that we nd, resulting in a
worse sex ratio, i.e. a lower equilibrium value of x:
We now examine the e¤ects of technological progress, i.e. a reduction in c; upon equilib-
rium welfare, W (x(c)): Using the indi¤erence condition, this can be written as
dW (x(c)
dc
=
@ ~V
@x

x=x
dx
dc
+ 1:
=
2~V 0(x)jx=x
~U 0(x) jx=x   ~V 0(x) jx=x
+ 1: (7)
The results here are exactly parallel with those in section 1. When x < 1; ~V 0(x) jx=x < 0
is smaller than ~U 0(x) jx=x in absolute magnitude, due to the match e¢ ciency e¤ect. Thus
the rst term is negative but greater than  1; and thus equilibrium welfare is an increasing
function of c; since a higher value of c increases x: Conversely, when x > 1; technological
progress increases welfare. We summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 2 Consider a marriage market with frictional matching, where match e¢ -
ciency is maximized when the sex ratio is balanced. If uB  uG > ci, both the equilibrium sex
ratio and the welfare optimal sex ratio are biased towards boys, and the equilibrium has ex-
cessive boys compared to the welfare optimum. Technological progress that reduces c reduces
welfare. Conversely, if uB   uG < ci; and there is a natural excess supply of girls due to the
marriage squeeze, the equilibrium sex ratio has an excessive number of girls.
Our main result, that the equilibrium sex ratio is ine¢ cient in the presence of gender bias,
is quite general, and applies as long as intra-household allocations vary continuously with the
sex ratio. That is, as long as t (:) is a continuous function, equilibrium requires adjustment
in quantities as well as prices. When the sex ratio a¤ects intra-household allocation in a
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continuous way, this reduces the magnitude of gender imbalances due to gender biased
preferences but does not eliminate them. Our qualitative conclusions, that selection that
results in sex ratio imbalances is welfare reducing, are una¤ected. That is, the congestion
externalities identied in section 1 continue to play a key role in determining welfare. The
policy implications, that governments should subsidize girls and tax boys if the sex ratio has
an excess of boys, is also reinforced.
3 Heterogeneity
What are the implications of the population belonging to distinct groups, who are ex ante
heterogeneous, e.g. they belong to di¤erent classes/ castes or linguistic groups? One may
distinguish two distinct cases, horizontal di¤erentiation and vertical di¤erentiation. With
vertical di¤erentiation, groups are hierarchically ordered, and an individual prefers a partner
of higher status to one of lower status, independent of the individuals own status. Class or
caste are a possible examples. Horizontal di¤erentiation occurs when an individual prefers
a partner of his/her own group linguistic, regional or religious identity are cases in point.
These two cases turn out to have very di¤erent implications.
To model horizontal heterogeneity, let there be two groups or regions, 1 and 2: Let H be
the payo¤ to an individual from matching with someone from the same region, and L be the
payo¤ from matching with someone from a di¤erent region. Suppose that gender preferences
are the same across regions. The equilibrium sex ratio will be the same in both regions,
and in a stable match, there will be no inter-regional marriages. Now suppose that region
1 has large gender bias, while region 2 has no gender bias. In the absence of inter-regional
marriages, the sex ratio in region 1 will be r1 < 1. In the absence of population growth,
the sex ratio in region 2 will be 1. A male of quality "1 = F (1   r1) is available to any
woman in region 2, and the woman with the greatest incentive to make this match is the
one with the lowest quality,  = 0: Her payo¤ from making this match is " 1+L, while her
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payo¤ from matching within her own region is H : Thus the imbalance in region 1 must be
large enough to o¤set the payo¤ di¤erence H   L; before any inter-regional marriages take
place.19 If there is population growth, then there will be an excess supply of girls in region 2,
and those of the lowest quality will marry the lowest quality boys from region 1. However,
inter-regional marriages yield small gains in utility, since both parties to the marriage get a
payo¤ only of L; and therefore, the e¤ects of ex ante selection decisions will be small.
Vertical di¤erentiation is qualitatively di¤erent, since inter-group marriages will have
large utility consequences for one party. Let us assume that there are two classes (or castes),
H and L; with measures  and 1 respectively. Assume the value from being matched does
not vary across boys and girls, but does depend upon the status of the partner. Let i be
the value from being matched to a partner of status i; where i 2 fL;Hg: Assume also that
the preference parameters are identical across the two classes.20
Consider rst the upper class. If a girl married to a high class person is preferable to a
boy married to a low class person (i.e. if uB + L < uG + H); and if c is su¢ ciently small,
the equilibrium sex ratio in the upper class, rH ; satises
uB + r

H
H + (1  rH)L   2c = uG + H : (8)
The left hand side of the above expression shows the expected value of boy, less the
expected cost of ensuring a girl; the right hand side shows the value of a girl. Clearly, rH
< 1 if uB   uG > 2c:
Now let us consider the lower class. A measure 1 r

H
1+rH
 of upper class boys are available,
and if the sex ratio in the lower class is rL; the measure of lower class girls is rL1+rL : So each
lower class girl has a probability (1+rL)(1 r

H)
rL(1+r

H)
 of marrying an upper class boy. This leaves a
measure
h
rL
1+rL
  1 rH
1+rH

i
of lower class girls who are matched with a measure 1
1+rL
of lower
19This assumes non-transferable utility. With transferable utility, the condition for inter-regional marriage
is more stringent "1 must be greater than 2(H   L).
20We may allow our utility parameters (uB ; uG and c) to be indexed by class the equations that follow
also apply with the appropriate indexation. However, some of the qualitative results  the comparisions
across classes depend on the parameters not being too di¤erent across classes.
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class boys. Consequently, if the ratio of the former to the latter is less than one, some lower
class boys are left unmatched, while girls will be left unmatched if the ratio is greater than
one. The payo¤ to lower class boys is therefore given by
UL(rL; r

H) = uB +min

rL   (1 + rL)(1  r

H)
1 + rH
; 1

L: (9)
The payo¤ to lower class girls is given by
V L(rL; r

H) = uG +
(1 + rL)(1  rH)
rL(1 + rH)
H
+min

1 + rH
(1 + rH) rL   (1 + rL) (1  rH)
; 1

L: (10)
The equilibrium sex ratio in the lower class, rL; is determined as follows. If
UL(1; rH)  V L(1; rH) <
2c; then rL = 1: Otherwise, r

L is such that
UL(1; rH)  V L(1; rH) = 2c:
The following observations are immediate from this analysis. rL > r

H ; that is the sex
ratio is more favorable to girls among the lower class than among the upper class. This
arises since the imbalance in the sex ratio amongst the upper class increases the payo¤ to
lower class girls (since they can marry up), while reducing the payo¤ to lower class boys (for
any value of rL; the probability that a lower class boy gets a partner increases with rH).
Indeed, it is possible that the sex ratio among the lower class is biased towards boys, if the
measure of the upper class is su¢ ciently large. This is probably empirically less likely, but
the absence of any bias against girls in outcomes is possible for a large range of parameters,
even though lower class preferences are as male biased as upper class ones. This result is
consistent with census data from India the sex ratio in the lowest castes (the scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes) are more female friendly than in the rest of the population.
They are also consistent with data from the 1931 Indian census, the last census for which
detailed caste based sex ratios at all levels are available. More recently, Portner (2010)
uses survey data on the fertility decisions of married women from Indias National Family
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Health Surveys in order to estimate the hazard rate for sex selective abortions. He nds
that selection is restricted to women with eight years of schooling. Since education is highly
correlated with caste and economic status, this is consistent with our theoretical predictions,
although education could also directly a¤ect the access to selection technologies.
From a welfare point of view, note that parental sex selection reduces ex ante expected
utility in the upper class, under similar assumptions as in our simple model (i.e. if uG  
uB + 2c+ 2(
H   L) > 0). More interesting is the e¤ect on the lower class, since selection
in the upper class raises the payo¤s to girls, while lowering the payo¤ to boys. A benchmark
case is when rL = 1; so that there is no selection in the lower class. Now if 
H < 2L; then
the benet to a girl who marries up is less than the cost to the consequent lower class boy
who fails to nd a partner. So sex selection reduces welfare also in the lower class. Suppose
now that rL < 1: In this case, negative welfare e¤ects are aggravated, since selection in the
lower class reduces welfare, as in the simple model. We conclude that sex selection reduces
welfare also in the lower class, on the assumption that parameter values are such that there
is no selection for girls in this class.21
The analysis presented here may be extended to an arbitrary nite number of classes 
see the discussion paper version of the paper, where we solve recursively for the equilibrium,
starting with the uppermost class. Our ndings in this section are most closely related to
those of Edlund (1999), who observed that upper class parents have more incentives to select
than lower class ones.22 She examines the consequence of sex selection in nite hierarchical
society where every individual is strictly ordered by rank, rank being endowed ex ante, and
where children inherit rank perfectly. She nds that if sex selection is perfect, then the
sex ratio will be balanced, with boys being chosen by high ranked individuals, and girls by
lower ranked individuals. Our model produces a more nuanced nding, since upper class
21If parameter values are such that there is selection for girls, then it is possible for sex selection to be
welfare increasing for the lower class.
22This is also related to the famous Trivers-Willard (1971) hypothesis of evolutionary biology, which argues
that high quality individuals have more incentives to have boys, while low quality individuals (i.e. those in
poor health, or facing di¢ cult nutritional circumstances) have a greater incentive to have girls.
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individuals will not choose to have only boys, even if sex selection is perfect; however, the
sex ratio in the upper class will be more biased than in the lower class. Aggregate sex ratios
can be unbalanced even when selection is perfect and costless (c = 0); due to the fact that
each class has a large number of ex ante homogeneous agents. 23 Our welfare results also
show that all classes can be worse o¤ due to selection.
4 Societies without generalized gender bias
Our analysis may also be applied to societies without generalized gender bias, such as the
UK or the US, where sex selection could be used for family balancing reasons. In the UK, the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority recommended against allowing sex selection
for "social reasons" (including family balancing).24 The American Society of Reproductive
Medicine is more positive : "If ow cyclometry or other methods of preconception gender
selection are found to be safe and e¤ective, physicians should be free to o¤er preconcep-
tion gender selection in clinical settings to couples who are seeking gender variety in their
o¤spring..." (May 2001).
While there is unease in o¢ cial circles with allowing sex selection, there is considerable
evidence that many parents have a desire for gender balance within the family. US census
data for 1980 and 1990 shows that women with two children are 6% more likely to have a
third child if the children are of the same gender (Angrist and Evans, 1998). The probability
of a third child is slightly greater (1-2%) if the two children are girls rather than boys. This
suggests that gender balancing is a primary concern, but also that the sexes are not treated
completely symmetrically. Dahl and Moretti (2008) present suggestive evidence that parents
in the US, especially men, prefer boys to girls. 25
23We conjecture that our results would also hold when agents are strictly ordered ex ante in terms of
expected quality, provided that there was an element of ex post heterogeneity which could produce di¤erent
rankings with some probability.
24The UK allows sex selection for genetic reasons, when there is the risk of gender specic genetic disorders.
25They nd that women with rst born daughters are less likely to marry, and also more likely to divorce
if married, than women whose rst born is a son. Interestingly, shot-gun marriage is more likely if the child
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To examine these issues, we adapt the model of gender preferences based on family
composition. For expositional reasons, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. Let
us assume that the number of children is xed exogenously at two. We also assume that
there is no idiosyncratic component to match value, and that the payo¤ from nding a
partner does not di¤er across sexes. We also assume that all individuals are willing to select;
however, our analysis applies, with obvious modications when only a part of society wishes
to do so, since the sex ratio in the non-selecting population will be balanced.
Let uij, i; j 2 fG;Bg denote the base payo¤ from from having gender composition ij: To
reect preferences for gender balancing, assume that uGB > uBB and uGB > uGG (we assume
uBG = uGB; i.e. there are no order e¤ects). We shall also assume that uBB > uGG; to allow
for the possibility that preferences are not completely symmetric across genders, i.e. there
is an element of bias (our analysis obviously applies, with minor modication, if the bias is
reversed, so that uBB < uGG): Let us assume that uGB uGG > 2c; so that the parents of one
girl have an incentive to select if this condition is not satised, it is clear that there must
be no selection, either in equilibrium or at the social optimum. Note that asymmetries can
also arise for technological reasons. Sperm separation techniques are currently more e¤ective
for selecting for girls than boys, so that the e¤ective cost of selection could di¤er across the
sexes. Our analysis would also apply if there were di¤erences in the costs of selection rather
than di¤erences in gender specic utilities.
Given our assumptions, the equilibrium sex ratio r will be less than or equal to one. Thus,
a daughter will be sure to nd a partner, while a son will nd a partner with probability
r: Let 2 be the payo¤ to the parents when both children nd a partner, and let 1 be the
payo¤ when one child nds a partner, where 0 < 1 < 2.
Suppose that uGB   uBB > 2c. In this case, there is an equilibrium where every parent
exercises choice after having the rst child and has a child of the opposite gender. Thus
in utero is a boy, and the mother has an ultrasound. They also nd that if the rst birth is a daughter,
this increases the expected number of children. Abrevaya (2009) nds evidence of biased sex ratios in Asian
families in the US.
36
every family is gender balanced, consisting of one boy and one girl, and the sex ratio is
balanced. Indeed, this is the only equilibrium r < 1 cannot be an equilibrium outcome,
since a parent whose rst child is a boy has a strict incentive to exercise choice.
Suppose now that uGB   uBB < 2c: In this case, one cannot have an equilibrium with a
balanced sex ratio, where all parents select after the rst child, irrespective of gender. Nor
can there be a balanced equilibrium where no parent selects. So we consider the equations
uGB   uGG   (1  r)[2   1] = 2c: (11)
uGB   uBB + r(1  r)[2   1] + (1  r)21 = 2c: (12)
Equation (11) is the indi¤erence condition for a parent whose rst child is a girl. Let rG
be the value of r that solves this equation. Equation (12) is the indi¤erence condition for
a parent whose rst child is a boy; let rB be the value of r that solves this equation. We
shall assume that parameter values are such that maxfrG; rBg  3=5 (3=5 is the minimal
sex ratio that can be achieved by selection for the second child, conditional on the gender
of the rst):26 This ensures that equilibrium sex ratio is given by maxfrG; rBg. That is, if
rG > r

B; the equilibrium sex ratio is r

G; where all parents whose rst child is a boy strictly
prefer not to exercise choice, while a fraction of those with girls exercise choice. On the other
hand, if rG < r

B, the equilibrium sex ratio is r

B: In this case, all parents whose rst child
is a girl strictly prefer to exercise choice, while a fraction of those with boys exercise choice.
Our welfare criterion is the ex ante expected utility of the representative parent. If the
equilibrium sex ratio is rG; then a parent who has a girl is indi¤erent between selecting for a
boy and not doing so. By not selecting, such a parent improves the sex ratio, so that in the
aggregate two individuals get partners, thereby raising social welfare. Similarly, if the sex
26Since we are discussing societies without generalized gender bias, this is the plausible range of parameters
 the equilibrium sex ratio is unlikely to be very distorted. For completeness, we note that if maxfrG; rBg <
3=5; then the equilibrium sex ratio will equal 3=5:
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ratio is rB; a parent who has a boy is indi¤erent between selecting for a girl and not doing
so. In this case, by selecting, she exercises a positive externality on society. Thus, in either
case the equilibrium is ine¢ cient and social welfare can be increased by moving towards a
more balanced sex ratio.
We now turn to a characterization of the global social optimum. Let us assume that
[uBG   uGG   2c]   2[2   1] < 0: This condition states that the net gain from selection
for a parent whose rst child is a girl is lower than the marriage market cost of leaving two
boys unmatched, where these boys belong a family where one child nds a partner. It will
be satised, for example, if the parent does not wish to select if he knows that the selected
boy will not nd a partner (but is weaker than this condition). In this case, the global
optimum corresponds to the a balanced sex ratio. This could either be due to ensuring that
all parents exercise choice, if (uBB uBG 2c)+(uGG uBG 2c) > 0 this condition states
that the sum of benets of selection for a pair of parents, one of which has a girl and the
other has a boy, is greater than the sum of costs. Alternatively, if this inequality is reversed,
social optimality is attained with no selection. We summarize these results in the following
proposition, which is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 3 If uGB uBB < 2c < uGB uGG, the equilibrium sex ratio equalsmaxfrG; rBg <
1; where some but not all parents exercise choice after the rst child. Such an equilibrium
is ine¢ cient and e¢ ciency is improved by making the sex ratio more balanced. The wel-
fare optimal allocation has a balanced sex ratio if [uBG   uGG   2c]   2[2   1] < 0: If
(uBB   uBG  2c) + (uGG  uBG  2c) > 0; the optimal allocation has every family exercising
choice and being gender balanced; otherwise, the optimal allocation has no family exercising
choice.
To summarize, in societies without pronounced gender bias, sex selection for family bal-
ancing purposes may have no adverse consequences, as long as it is balanced at the aggregate
level. However, if preferences are not completely symmetric, then aggregate imbalances may
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arise, and thus there may be a marriage market congestion externality. There are a number
of caveats regarding this conclusion. First, if the proportion of the population that selects is
small, the imbalance will be proportionally small. Second, if preference imbalances are rela-
tively minor, then it may be relatively easy to provide incentives to address any imbalance
that may arise.
5 Conclusions
This papers main contribution is a model of the equilibrium sex ratio when parents can
choose the gender of their child. This allows us to examine the welfare consequences of
selection. If gender bias is large, parental choice results in too many boys, and reduces
welfare. Conversely, if intrinsic gender bias is mild or absent, and the observed preference
for boys is due to the excess supply of girls due to the marriage squeeze, selection may
increase welfare. We combine these theoretical results with empirical evidence to show that
sex selection and the marriage squeeze have diametrically opposite e¤ects in the two largest
societies in the world, China and India. In China, our data show an acute shortage of men,
while in most of India, the marriage squeeze e¤ectively implies a surplus of women on the
marriage market. Thus sex selection is unambiguously welfare reducing in China, but its
welfare e¤ects are more nuanced in India.
The model we have presented is simple, but its results are robust in many ways; they
hold if household allocations or parental investments are inuenced by the sex ratio, in
a continuous way. They also hold if parental investment decisions in their children are
inuenced by marriage market conditions. We believe that the model provides a useful
framework to examine a host of issues related to sex ratios, and indeed, in ongoing work,
we have used it to examine the e¤ects on parental investments, and the e¤ect of fertility
reductions upon the sex ratio.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We show that the global welfare optimum corresponds to r = 1
under assumption A1. At r < 1; the derivative of welfare is given by
W 0(r)jr<1 = (uG + G + 2c  uB) +

1  r + r


(B + E()) +

1  1

  r
2

E(j  ):
Since the rst term in brackets is strictly positive, it su¢ ces to show that the second
and third terms is positive. Since E("j"  ") is bounded above by "; and "  0; a su¢ cient
condition for these to be positive is
(B + E())
"
 r +    
2
 ((1  r) + r) :
Since the right hand side above is less than 1

; the inequality is satised under A1.
Consider now the derivative at r > 1 :
W 0(r)jr>1 = (uG+2c uB B) 
1
r

1

+
r
2
  1

(G+E("))+
1
r

1  r + r


E(j  ):
Since the rst term in brackets is strictly negative, it su¢ ces to show that the sum of the
remaining terms is negative. This reduces to the condition
G + E(")
E(j  )  
(1  r) + r
 + r   2 (13)
A1 states that  + 1 > 2; so the denominator on the right hand side of (13) is positive.
The derivative of the right hand side of (13) with respect to r is negative, and so if the
inequality is satised for r = 1; it is also satised for all larger values of r: Thus the critical
condition is
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G + E(")
E(j  ) 

 + 1  2 ;
which is ensured by A1.
Proofs relating to section 2 and proposition 2:
We show rst that t(x) is decreasing in x: Di¤erentiating (4) we obtain
dt
dx
=
0(x)(  t)  0(x)(+ (t)
(+ i) + ( + i)0(t)
< 0;
since  is decreasing in x and  is increasing.
To show that the match e¢ ciency term is maximized at x = 1; dene
M 0(x)  (1  ) ~U 0(x) +  ~V 0(x):
Di¤erentiating the expressions for ~U and ~V and using condition (4):
M 0(x) =
0(+ i) + (1  )0( + i)
(+ i)( + i)2
(  t) +


i(+ i)
0(t)  (1  )
i( + i)

t0(x):
At x = 1, 0 =  0,  =  and  = 1
2
; so the rst term equals zero. Since 0(0) = 1; the
second term is also zero.
Proof of Proposition 3: If rG > r

B; then at r

G a parent whose rst child is a girl is
indi¤erent between selecting and not selecting, while a parent whose rst child is a boy strictly
prefers not to select, verifying that the associated behavior corresponds to an equilibrium.
Similarly, if rG < r

B; then at r

B, the associated behavior corresponds to an equilibrium.
Let us now turn to welfare, as a function of selection decisions. With probability one-half,
the rst child is a girl. Let i denote the fraction of parents who exercise choice after having
a having a rst child of sex i; ; i 2 fG;Bg: Let  = G   B be a measure of the imbalance
in the sex ratio, where  is related to r by the equation r = 4 
4+
: Welfare is given by
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W (; B) =
1    B
4
VGG(r)+
1  B
4
VBB(r())+
2 + + 2(B)
4
VBG(r())  2(B) + 
2
c;
(14)
where Vij(r) is the overall payo¤ from having family composition ij; as a function of r:
We rst show that the equilibrium outcome is ine¢ cient as long as  di¤ers from zero.
@W
@
=
1
4
[VBG   VGG   2c] + 1  B
4
@VBB
@
+
2 + + 2B
4
@VBG
@
: (15)
Suppose the equilibrium sex ratio equals rG: In this case, the term in square brackets
equals zero, since the parents who rst have a girl are indi¤erent between choosing a boy
and accepting natures lottery. Since VBB and VBG are both decreasing in  when this is
positive as long as 1 > 0 and 2   1 > 0; the derivative of W with respect to  is negative
at this equilibrium.
To deal with the case where the equilibrium sex ratio equals rB; we re-write welfare as a
function of  and G; W^ (; G): The derivative of welfare with respect to  is now given by
@W^
@
=
1
4
[VBG   VGG   2c] + 1  G + 
4
@VBB
@
+
2  + 2G
4
@VBG
@
: (16)
Here again, the same argument applies: VBG   VGG   2c = 0 when the equilibrium sex
ratio is rB; and so welfare is decreasing in :
We now turn to characterizing the welfare optimal allocation in society. We rst in-
vestigate the conditions under which  = 0 (i.e. having a balanced sex ratio) is welfare
optimal. If  > 0; then some parent with a girl is selecting for a boy. By doing so, the
expected direct utility gain is [uBG   uGG   2c]: In consequence, two additional boys are
left unmatched, and the cost of this is at least 2[2   1]: So under the condition of the
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proposition ([uBG   uGG   2c]  2[2   1] < 0); it is socially optimal to have  = 0: 27
Given that  = 0 is welfare optimal, G = B: It is routine to verify that if (uBB uBG 
2c) + (uGG   uBG   2c) > 0; then optimality requires everyone exercising choice, while no
one must exercise choice if the inequality is reversed.
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